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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaiit iff-Respondent 
vs. . : 
WILLIAM STEWART : Case No. 13772 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, WILLIAM STEWART, appeals from a judgement 
and sentence entered against him in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On June 19 and 20, 1974 the Defendant-Appellant was tried to a 
jury before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson and found guilty of the offense 
of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a remand to the 
Third District Court for a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 19 and 20, 1974 the appellant Mr. William Stewart was J 
tried to a jury for the offense of Unlawful Distribution for Value of | 
the Controlled Sustance, Marijuana to the State's chief witness Rodney 
Ward. I 
The state 's chief witness, Rodney Ward, testified that on the J 
10th day of November 1973 he went to the police station (R-ll) contacted 
Officer Brophy of the Salt Lake Police Department (R -11) was "Strip I 
Searched" (R-12) and then given $20 by the officer (R-14). Mr. Ward | 
stated that he was taken to the neighborhood of 836 Licoln Street by 
Officer Brophy (R-14) where he purchased marijuana from the defendant I 
(R-18). Mr. Ward testified that he was then taken back to the police station ] 
where he gave the lids to Officer Brophy (R-20) and was searched by the 
officer (R-20). I 
Mr. Ward testified that while he was inside 836 Lincoln he was | 
i 
wearing a listening device. (R -13). 
During cross examination by appellants counsel the court sustained 
an objection, by the prosecution, to a question put to Mr. Ward concerning 
a juvenile court finding that he had burglarized a Salt Lake City Home (R-34). 
Officer Brophy testified that prior to sending Mr. Ward to 836 
Lincoln he had attached a monitoring device to his body (R-81). Officer 
Brophy testified further that he had taped the button open so that the 
monitoring device could not be shut off. Officer Brophy stated that he and 
Officer Millard had remained in their vehicle and recorded the conversation 
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between Mr. Ward and the appellant (R -81, 82). 
Officer Brophy then testified that he had subsequently erased 
rhe conversation on the tape (R-82). 
Defense counsel moved the Court to order the prosecution to 
produce the tape recordings of the actual conversation between the 
appellant and the State's Chief witness or in the alternative dismiss 
:he case against the appellant (R-88). The motion was denied (R-88). 
Mr. Lynn Kenison testified that he is a chemist for the 
Salt Lake County Health Department (R-114), that he had analyzed 
'he substance which Mr. Ward had given the police (R-115) and found 
it to be marijuana (R-115). 
The defendant-appellant testified that he had never sold marijuana 
•:oMr. Ward (R-139). 
The jury found the defendant-appellant guilty of selling marijuana 
(T-33). On July 19, 1974 the court sentenced the defendant to the Utah 
State Prison for undetermined time as provided for by law and ordered 
him for committed. (T-37). 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
WHERE THE APPELLANT'S COUNSEL WAS NOT ALLOWED 
TO QUESTION THE STATE'S CHIEF WITNESS CONCERNING HIS 
PREVIOUS JUVENILE COURT ADJUDICATIONS OF GUILT THE 
APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
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I 
During the trial the court sustained the prosecutors objection 
to a question by the defense counsel concerning a prior juvenile court ] 
finding that the state 's chief witness had been guilty of burglary (R-34). -
In Davis v. Alaska 415 U. S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L ED. 2d 
347 (1974) the Supreme Court considered the identical question presented 1 
in the Case at bar. The Court in Davis (supra) reversed the conviction • 
of a defendant whose defense counsel had been prevented from inquiring 
into a prior juvenile adjudication against the state 's chief witness stating ] 
TTthe states policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile i 
offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional 
right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness. " J 
The court also reiterated the holding of Brookhart v. Janis 384 U. S. I, j 
162 Ed 2d 314, 86 S. Ct. 1245 (1966) that denial of effective cross-examination 
is "Constitutional e r ro r of the first magnitude and no amount of showing j 
of want of prejudice would cure it. M i 
POINT II 
DISTRUCTION BY THE POLICE OF EVIDENCE MATERIAL TO | 
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WITH WHICH A DEFENDANT IS 
CHARGED IS VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
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In Brady v. Maryland 373 US 83, 10 L Ed 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 
(1963), the Supreme Court held at 218 L Ed 2d 10 that "the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment 
irrespective of the good fait or bad faith of the prosecutor. " 
In Cheatwoodv. People 165 CI 334, 435 P2d 402 (1968) the Colorado 
Supreme Court reversed a denial of a motion for a new trial stating at 
405 P2d 435 "Evidence which might be helpful to a defendant and which is 
suppressed by the police or the prosecution or which is ignored by a trial 
court when presented to it results in a denial of due process of law . . . " 
emphasis added. 
In Seattle v. Fettig 10 Wash. App 773, 519 P2d 1002 (1974) the 
defendant was tried and convicted of Driving while under the Influence. 
Shortly after his arrest the defendant performed physical test which were 
recorded on video tape. After trial and conviction in the City Court the 
case was appealed. Prior to the appeal trial the video tape was negligently 
destroyed by the police. At trial the Defendant was convicted. The Supreme 
Court of Washington reversed stating at 1004 P2d 519 "In the present case the video 
tape was negligently destroyed and thereby suppressed. Although the police 
destroyed the video tape, their acts are chargeable to the prosecutor; the 
suppression therefore was "by the prosecution." Moreover, that the suppression 
was negligent rather than deliverate is not material here; the defendants 
due process rights are affected in either case." 
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In Trimble v. State of New Mexico 75 N. M. 183, 402 P2d 165 (1965) 
an officer pursuant to a search warrant picked up 20 roles of tape 
recordings at the church where the defendant was the pastor. The 
officer listened to a part of the tapes then locked them in a file drawer. 
The officer admitted that the tapes would be easy to erase and there appears to 
be a question as to whether the defendant ever got the tapes back. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed the defendants First 
Degree Murder Conviction stating at 166 P2d 402" and what about the tape 
recordings? Their availability as corroboration if present as claimed 
has been lost forever, and the jury was left with the statement by the police 
that they contained nothing concerning the case. Possibly so, But the 
defendant was deprived of the opportunity to use them to support his defense 
. . . " See also People v. Hoffman 32 III. 2d 96, 203 N. E. 2d 873 (1965). 
Trimble, supra, held further that whether the suppression was willfull or 
negligent was immaterial. 
Appellant's position in the case at bar is sustantiaily stronger than 
either Fettig, supra or Trimble, supra, for the reaons that: 
.1. Subsequent to the offense and prior to trial the police deliberately 
destroyed the tape; and 
2. Conversations between the defendant and the states chief witness 
occuring during the transaction for which the defendant was tried are 
obviously material. 
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The tape was physical evidence with which to either substantiate 
or discredit the states case. The police didn't even see fit to transcribe 
':he conversation nor is there any evidence that they ever even listened 
•o the recording. The first time the appellant's counsel became aware 
"hat a tape had existed was at trial (R-88). The police chose rather to be in a 
position to summarize, if necessary, from memory, a very small part 
of that conversation. In short make a self serving declaration in support 
of a case which they have filed and deny the fact finders the opportunity 
o^ know completely what actually transpired between the appellant and the 
states chief witness. 
Unlike most cases where the police investigate a crime after its 
commission in the case at bar they planned and arranged for the commission 
of the offense. The police then severely hampered the defendant in his 
ability to prepare his defense by waiting four (4) months to ar res t and charge 
him (T-3, 4). The degree of damage is further hightened when we consider 
that the defense of entrapment common to this type of offense is one in which 
exact conversations are very crutial. To allow the police officer to destroy 
ohysical evidence material to the offense in a case such as presented here 
is to condone their suppression of evidence of every conceivable nature 
in every type of case. 
C O N G L U S I O N 
In so far as appellants counsel was not allowed proper liatitude 
in his cross-examination of the state chief witness and the police intentionally 
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destroyed physical evidence material to the offense charged the 
appellants conviction must be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK We KUNKLER 
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